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Is American power in decline? What is the relationship between the perceived decline of 
American power and the rise of Donald Trump and authoritarian politics elsewhere? Understanding 
the puzzle of American decline and the world order requires the recognition of how capital and 
wealth are unjustly distributed, entrenched, and sustained across the society. The core argument here 
maintains that American decline pertains not only to the decreasing economic vitality underscored 
by the concrete detrimental effects generated through sharpening material inequality within the US. 
Rather, decline also constitutes its decreasing appeal and legitimacy as a dominant actor in the 
international system. This paper contributes to current scholarly and policy debates on American 
power and authoritarianism in three ways. First, it offers a more holistic conception of American 
power, particularly by highlighting both its materialist and ideational foundations that co-constitute 
each other during its periods of ascent, consolidation, and decline. Second, it underscores the 
mutually reinforcing interdependence of domestic and transnational dimensions of US power. Third, 
while dominant scholarship on American decline rarely address its implications on international 
human rights, the paper highlights the uniqueness of the Trump presidency and the emerging 
authoritarian politics elsewhere: while neoliberalism’s detrimental consequences to human rights 
within and beyond the US constitute a relatively long history, Trump and his allies have abandoned 




• American power constitutes the mutually reinforcing relationship of domestic conditions 
as well as transformative changes in the international system— an insight often ignored in 
dominant International Relations scholarship on American decline. 
• The decline of American power constitutes its decreasing appeal and legitimacy as a 
dominant actor in the international system. 
• Examining the status of American power includes its material position and legitimation 
tactics within the United States and in the international system. 
• While neoliberalism’s detrimental consequences to human rights preceded the Trump 
administration, currently emerging discourses have abandoned the legitimation tactics that 
Trump’s predecessors had so willingly used. 
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On the 20th January 2017, amidst a dreary weather in Washington DC, Donald Trump was 
sworn in as the 45th US President, as millions of Americans and people worldwide closely listened 
to and watched his inaugural address. In contrast to his post-Cold War predecessors, President 
Trump advocates blatant economic and military protectionism, which aims to supposedly resurrect 
America’s greatness from the fundamental challenges of prevalent poverty in inner American cities, 
economic degradation, proliferation of crimes and domestic security problems, and the apparent 
deterioration of US military capacities. As heavy rain poured when Trump commenced his inaugural 
address, the cloudy skies and chilly temperature somehow prefigured Trump’s vision of restoring 
the US in its former glory.  This overarching strategy of the Trump administration for restoring 
national greatness emerges from the diagnosis that Trump’s predecessors systematically disregarded 
US national interest in favor of bolstering the military capacities and economic development of 
America’s allies. Trump’s America First policy suggests that decades-long commitment for liberal 
internationalism — specifically, global engagement through multilateral forms of governance, 
commitment to increased economic cooperation through open trade, and promotion of human rights, 
democracy, and liberal values — have to be abandoned by embracing instead nationalistic and anti-
interventionist policies. Those policies, as the Trump administration has repeatedly alluded to, 
include the dramatic reduction of US foreign aid, the systematic review and eventual withdrawal (if 
necessary) from the longstanding security guarantees given to US allies, and the abandonment of 
policies that rhetorically promote democracy, good governance, and human rights abroad1.  
Domestically, several decades of economic stagnation and political crises in recent years 
underscore more structural problems within the American homeland. While the end of the Cold War 
in the early 1990s brought a sense of political optimism that humanity is on the road to inevitable 
progress, with the hope that the appetite for democracy and human rights would unstoppably gain 
traction worldwide, the 9/11 terror attacks in the U.S. ushered in a new era in American foreign and 
domestic policies. The Bush administration’s global war on terror paved the way for the 
unprecedented expansion in American security apparatus and bolstered the terror-oriented policies 
of US allies. Consequently, the growing demand for robust security states in the name of national 
security systematically undermined the US government’s commitment in promoting civil and 
political rights as well as liberal democracy abroad. Meanwhile, the 2007/2008 financial crisis 
highlights the fundamental limitations of American exceptionalism; specifically, the growing 
material inequality and a weakened US welfare state system illustrate how social mobility, as one 
of core elements of the exceptionalist narrative, is fast becoming an unattainable goal for the 
majority of Americans. 
That climate of uncertainty motivates the following puzzle: Is American power in decline? 
What is the relationship between the perceived decline of American power and the rise of Trump 
and authoritarian politics elsewhere? In view of that overarching puzzle, this paper is structured 
based on the following organizational logic. In the next section, I discuss the assumptions and the 
theoretical motivations for understanding the puzzle about the current political challenges in the US 
and world order. I also discuss in this section my overarching arguments on the current status of 
American power and its implications to international human rights. Second, the paper provides a 
critical review of the literature on the status of American power as well as the Trump 
administration’s domestic and foreign policies that directly impact human rights. That section 
constitutes the core discussion of the paper, whereby I discuss the main elements of the decline of 
                                               
1 See, for example, the Amnesty International USA’s long list of human rights failures and infractions of the Trump 
administration during its first 100 days: https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/trump_first_hundred_days.pdf  
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American power in world politics; namely, that the decline of American power and the political 
challenges represented by Donald Trump constitute the fundamental contradictions in the neoliberal 
logic that governs American politics and the world political economy. The third substantive section, 
meanwhile, makes the case that the global human rights regime is currently in distress and outlines 
some of the conditions that facilitated such a situation. The paper concludes by underscoring the 
prospects for the durability of American power and the conditions under which the global human 
rights regime could transform in an era of rising powers.  
 
 
2. The Puzzle and Arguments: United States in a Neoliberal World Order 
 
From the pragmatic idealism of Obama to the blatantly racist, sexist, and crudely nationalist 
tirades of Trump and his allies, contemporary US domestic and foreign policy strategies appear to 
have pivoted to another direction. Trump has consistently expressed his admiration for authoritarian 
leaders elsewhere, including the North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un: “He speaks and his people sit 
up at attention. I want my people to do the same” (Trump 2018 in Powers 2018). Considering the 
emerging anti-democratic elements due to the rise of Trump and perceived decline of American 
power brought by the emergence of China’s development, this paper seeks to address the following 
puzzle: Is American power in decline? What is the relationship between the perceived decline of 
American power and the rise of Trump and authoritarian politics elsewhere?  
Understanding the puzzle of American decline and the world order requires the recognition 
of how capital and wealth are unjustly distributed, entrenched, and sustained within the US and the 
international system. I outline and discuss the macro-conditions that have facilitated the decline in 
American power, with a particular focus on the neoliberal logic that it has persistently upheld 
domestically and abroad. While I admit that the “idea of universal human rights is indeed headed 
for hard time” (Forsythe 2017, 7), a sense of cautious optimism and a reform strategy are needed to 
prepare for even the worst and the most fundamental challenges to the post-World War 2 global 
human rights order.  
For the analytic purposes of this paper, I define American power as the generation, in and 
through domestic and transnational interdependence, of outcomes that influence the capacities and 
perceptions of actors and institutions to determine their situation (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 39). My 
conception of American power is more holistic because it refers to the US, as a state, in its projection 
of both the objective materialist capabilities such as military strength and economic performance 
and also its intersubjective elements such as legitimacy, moral appeal, and reputation (Bridoux 
2017) within and beyond its formal territorial borders.  
 The scholarly debates on American decline is not unique to the contested presidency of 
Donald Trump (Regilme and Parisot 2017, 8). Yet, this debate can be roughly divided into two 
camps. The first camp includes those who maintain that US global dominance is likely to be 
sustained in the foreseeable future (Panitch and Gindin 2012). Starrs (2018, 817), for instance, 
contend that “despite the declining global share of United States GDP from 40% in 1960 to below 
a quarter from 2008 onward”, American firms remain dominant in many important and highly 
competitive fields. Recognizing the challenges posed by emerging powers to American empire, 
Parisot (2013, 1171) argues that “they have made moves against empire, they remain deeply 
embedded within it, and probably will be for many years to come”. Ikenberry (2018) echoes this 
argument of further entrenchment of rising powers within an American-led international system. 
That system, accordingly, allows for integration of other states within its institutions and rules, 
provides possibilities for leadership, shares the benefits widely, and accommodates diversity.  
On the other hand, a broad range of scholars and commentators maintain that American 
power has indeed declined. As the sociologist Ho-fung Hung (2018, 40) accurately describes, 
“plenty of people on the left and the right agree with the judgment that ‘America is in decline’ 
underlying the “Make America Great Again” slogan” — the diagnosis shared by many left- and 
right-leaning commentators and scholars. Even before Trump, Arrighi (2007) contends that the 
American ‘war on terror’ represents a ‘terminal decline’ of United States hegemony, while 
Wallerstein (2009) diagnoses the 1970s as the start of slump and the 9/11 terror attacks highlighted 
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America’s vulnerabilities. Similarly, Julian Go (2012, 211) identifies the mid-1970s up to the 
current era as the period of American decline, characterized by militaristic aggression, territorial 
occupations, and air strikes, while Wallerstein (2009, 1) predicts that “the economic, political, and 
military factors that contributed to U.S. hegemony are the same factors that will inexorably produce 
the coming U.S. decline”. Other scholars, meanwhile, contend a more moderate position. Although 
he believes that the American-led international order is declining, Acharya (2018) maintains that 
the emerging system will be increasingly shaped by a diverse array of actors including new actors 
as well as old and new powers.  
Considering that debate, my core argument maintains that American decline pertains not 
only to the decreasing economic vitality underscored by the concrete detrimental effects generated 
through neoliberalism vis-à-vis the sharpening material inequality within the US. Rather, decline 
also constitutes America’s decreasing appeal and legitimacy as a dominant actor in the international 
system. The latter element becomes much more visible especially in the case of the Trump 
presidency when racist, sexist, and blatantly nationalist discourses that have become so normalized 
in global and national mainstream public spheres. Various structural deficiencies and injustices that 
are entrenched in the US neoliberal political economy — a governance model that many countries 
worldwide have adopted in varying scales and extent of localization— have facilitated this decline 
of American power. Specifically, the Trump administration has accelerated neoliberal policies 
coupled with authoritarian discourses and practices in ways that have meaningfully undermined the 
legitimating foundations of American power. Therefore, the puzzle on American decline is not only 
a problem of discursive legitimation as punctuated by the horrendous rhetoric of Trump. Rather, the 
logic of wealth accumulation through neoliberalism has engendered severe distributive injustice 
within the US and in the world economy, and Trump unabashedly championed that logic without 
instrumentally invoking discourses on human rights, democracy, and rule of law. 
 This paper engages with the aforementioned opposing stances on American decline in three 
exploratory ways. First, I offer a more holistic conception of American power, particularly by 
highlighting both its materialist and ideational foundations that co-constitute each other during its 
periods of ascent, consolidation, and decline2. Many scholars in those two opposing stances 
underscore only the materialist elements of American power, as demonstrated by military prowess 
and economic indicators, and unfortunately, sidelining the importance of moral appeal and claims 
for legitimacy of American power. Amid the increasing material strength of rival powers such as 
China, the Trump presidency reinforces the decline of American power as it has blatantly eschewed 
its justificatory and normative underpinnings that his predecessors had quite consistently invoked, 
as the case maybe with the discourses on democracy, human rights, rule of law, and the purported 
shared benefits accrued from increasing economic globalization.  
Second, I underscore the mutually reinforcing interdependence of domestic and 
transnational dimensions of US power. Scholars in the decline debate usually highlight the 
transnational dimensions of the American power compared to other states in the international 
system. Yet, that analytic emphasis fails to recognize the two faces of American power, particularly 
its domestic and transnational elements. Indeed, the contradictions of neoliberalism as the core 
element of the domestic and transnational foundations of American power have facilitated its further 
decline. Domestically, the sharpening material inequality within the US generates pervasive internal 
social conflicts, and as research shows in the field of democratization studies, could lead to 
democratic backsliding or other forms of political instability (Rapley 2004; Regilme 2014; Boix 
2003). At the transnational level, neoliberalism, as a constitutive paradigm of American power, 
shows that unregulated financial markets, the pervasive commodification of human life, and the 
weakening of public goods provision undermine the legitimacy of American power — an outcome 
that becomes more pronounced especially when other rising powers discursively provide 
alternatives to the current world order3. As the US promotes neoliberal principles and unfettered 
wealth accumulation within and beyond its formal borders, its long-term domestic political and 
                                               
2 Refer to the work of Julian Go (2012) on a compelling comparison between British and American empires based on 
three periods: ascent, maturity, and decline.  
3 A new world order could be defined as that of ideological diversity, which Charles Kupchan (2012) describes as ‘no 
one’s world’, or an order increasingly defined by China as America’s most credible competitor (Schweller and Pu 
2011).  
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social stability are at risk, which in turn, undermines America’s material capacities and legitimacy 
to project its power abroad. This means that self-regulating market and socio-political stability are 
inherently incompatible (Polanyi 2001). Referring to the ‘trilemma paradox’, Dani Rodrik (2012) 
underscores the fundamental contradictions in the contemporary international system: that the 
simultaneous pursuit of democracy, economic globalization, and national self-determination is a 
recipe for disaster. This broader argument is further supported by quantitative research on the 
political effects of neoliberal globalization among advanced industrialized democracies since the 
1960s. Particularly, “more trade and FDI [foreign direct investments] are associated with a turn to 
anti-internationalism and anti-globalization”, while “social welfare spending also seems less and 
less able to mitigate this relationship” (Milner 2018, 40). This backlash against increasing economic 
interdependence through neoliberalism has generated deep-seated feelings of exclusion and 
profound material suffering for many people, who are unable to reap the benefits of globalization. 
Third, while the dominant International Relationship scholarship on the decline of American 
power rarely address its implications on international human rights, I provide some preliminary 
insights on their relationship. While neoliberalism’s detrimental consequences to human rights 
within and beyond the US constitute a relatively long history (Klein 2014), the Trump 
administration has abandoned the legitimation tactics that his predecessors had so willingly used. In 
building those arguments, I commence my analysis by zooming into the underlying conditions that 
undermine American power.  
 
3. American Power and Contemporary Challenges 
 
With the American imperium as its fulcrum (Katzenstein 2005), the current international 
system is experiencing a global political pandemic, whereby many electoral and constitutionally 
liberal democratic systems worldwide face severe problems of legitimation (Zürn 2018). The 
American political economy reflects the fundamental weaknesses of the neoliberal paradigm of 
national and global governance. In this paper, neoliberalism pertains to the “political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong 
private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey 2005, 2). Thus, the state assumes 
responsibility towards the polity, with a particular emphasis on the committed protection of a system 
of private property rights, the integrity of monetary governance, and the maintenance of external 
and internal coercive apparatuses and institutions — all of which are necessary to effectively enforce 
the logics of wealth accumulation and unrestrained market exchanges. Yet, neoliberal governance 
neglects crucial areas of social provision including high-quality and accessible education, health 
care, and other forms of social safety nets. Over time, electoral democratic societies with extreme 
levels of material inequality are more likely  to experience political instability, and given the right 
conditions, could possibly lead to democratic decay or even collapse (Regilme 2014).  
In recent decades, the legitimacy of American power rests not only upon its coercive power 
underwritten by its robust military and security apparatus. Instead, the US exceptionalist narrative 
— hinged upon human rights, electoral democracy, and free markets— has served as the 
foundational and broadly appealing justification for its dominant position in global governance. Yet, 
the Trump administration’s policy rhetoric has undermined US moral exceptionalism through 
blatant sexist, racist, discriminatory, and exclusionary tirades that have consistently proliferated 
domestic and international media.  This grim picture of the legitimacy of American power emerges 
amidst the increasing political confidence, military power, and economic growth of non-Western 
states —especially China, and to some extent Russia, in flagrantly asserting their interests in world 
politics. Prior to Trump’s anti-democratic discourses, American foreign policy has generally upheld 
democracy promotion and human rights as important, although, in a lot of cases, those goals have 
been used in sinister ways to justify disastrous military interventions (Forsythe 2011).  While US 
President Barack Obama campaigned for strong human rights protection, actual policies did not 
usually match the discourse, as exemplified in the increased number of human casualties killed by 
drone operations and the continued undermining of privacy rights through the expansion of state 
surveillance. Despite those deficiencies, Obama “never stooped to the kind of open disdain of human 
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rights concerns that is feared from Trump” (Roth 2017, 1). Even the Bush administration 
instrumentally invoked democracy promotion and human rights in the deadly conduct of the ‘war 
on terror’. What made Trump unique, in this regard, is the congruence of his discursive rejection of 
human rights norms with concrete and detrimental policy actions. Those actions include the 
following: threatening the staff of the International Criminal Court with travel bans and financial 
sanctions, pulling out of the UN Human Rights Council, withdrawal from the deliberations of the 
Global Compact for Migration, cancellation of its membership from UNESCO, and the elimination 
of US aid to the UN Reliefs and Works Agency, amongst many others (Finoh 2018; Human Rights 
Campaign 2017).  
Indeed, the US has championed neoliberalism in many countries worldwide, most especially 
after the Cold War in the form of the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Gore 2000). What are the key 
features of this paradigm? The first feature, on the one hand, pertains to its procedural elements of 
legitimation, particularly by using electoral processes, institutional checks and balances, and 
separation of powers between key branches of the government. Its constitutional order, at the 
minimum, upholds competitive elections as well as generally open and free political contestation as 
necessary in selecting key government officials and legislators. The second feature meanwhile, 
pertains to neoliberalism as the organizational logic of political economy. That logic undermines 
the role of the state in the equitable distribution of public goods, empowers the private sector in 
social life, and supports deregulation and austerity politics. Over time, in a democratic neoliberal 
capitalist society, the private sector creates extremely powerful coalitions of materially wealthy 
elites, who then reconfigures the constitutional order in their ultimate favor (Piketty 2014; Reich 
2010). In doing so, those elites recapture the state in more straightforward ways so as to accumulate 
more wealth — which, in turn, facilitates massive transfers of public goods into private coffers in 
the service of the elites’ uncontrollable hunger for wealth accumulation. Across generations, this 
process creates dangerous levels of inequality between the haves and the have-nots, thereby 
galvanizing social insecurity, fostering distrust in the political order, and weakening public goods 
provision systems (Piketty 2014). That situation could push those at the margins to upend the system 
in less conventional ways —perhaps using political violence, as conventionally legitimate modes of 
political dissent become more ineffective. Contemporary US politics demonstrate these 
exclusionary processes; that is, elites instrumentalize state institutions to further accumulate wealth, 
while marginalized individuals remain sidelined in public policy processes. In the context of 
electoral democracy, the neoliberal disregard for distributive justice becomes fatal to the 
constitutional order’s durability; that is because material sufficiency is the minimum requirement 
for all human individuals to function in the civic and political processes of an effective democracy. 
For example, the American billionaires Charles and David Koch pledged to spend 400 million USD 
during the 2018 midterm elections, in addition to their expansive network of projects espousing their 
interests in universities, think tanks, and other non-profit initiatives (Elliott 2018). That example 
demonstrates a unique development in early 21st century politics where billionaires and millionaires 
find it more effective to build their own network of political organizations in order to shape electoral 
and policy processes in ways that better reflect their interests than one-time donations to specific 
politicians (Hertel-Fernandez et. al. 2018).   
The apparently intractable social conflicts fueled by material insecurities constitute one of 
the key elements of the decline of American power, considering that such a model of governance is 
not purely an American phenomenon, but also projected across various national constitutional 
orders worldwide. As Carla Norloff (2018, 64) rightfully argues, the “challenge confronting the 
United States today is not an international redistribution problem but a domestic redistribution 
problem, which ‘America first’ will only make worse of the available gains to create more severe 
distributive pressures”, and she further contends that the uneven material gains in what is supposedly 
the international order is further reinforced by the uneven domestic distribution economic gains 
within the US. In the long-term, the sustainability of a state’s claim to world dominance depends on 
its ability to effectively manage internal socio-political unrest, which is often triggered by 
increasingly unmanageable economic inequality and the perceived lack of social mobility. As recent 
empirical research show, severe material insecurities in a society could generate various 
transformative forms of political instability, such as military coups (Houle 2016), ethnonationalist 
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civil wars (Cederman et. al. 2011), and various kinds of internal conflicts (Lessmann 2016; Krieger 
& Meierrieks 2016).  
There are some indications that the Trump presidency has accelerated America’s trajectory 
towards potentially transformative forms of political instability. Recognizing that “deepening 
polarization and radicalization of the Republican Party” have debilitated America’s democratic 
institutions since the 1980s, several scholars predict that the Trump administration could facilitate 
the emergence of “competitive authoritarianism — a system in which meaningful democratic 
institutions exist yet the government abuses state power to disadvantage its opponents” (Mickey et. 
al. 2017, 20). The Trump presidency advocate unregulated markets and the absence of domestic 
state interference in the national economy only to the extent that allies are given undue advantages 
(Stokes 2018: 135; Kang 2017, 2). Trump resisted to divest from his corporate interests, opposed 
openness to full disclosure of his wealth, strongly favors elites with clear interest in influencing 
governments policies in exchange for holding events and engaging in transactions in Trump-related 
businesses (Yglesias 2018). Even so, the Trump administration has been committed in punishing 
wealthy capitalists who publicly criticize him. For example, Trump threatened to use antitrust laws 
to punish Amazon, in retaliation to the billionaire Jeff Bezos, who also owns The Washington Post 
that has been persistent in its investigations of Trump’s scandals (Heer 2018).  
The decline of American dominance in the international system represents the inability of 
the current global and national constitutional orders to legitimize itself using its own moral logic as 
well as the endogenous mechanisms for self-correction. For example, emerging liberal democracies 
in the Global South regularly elect their ruling leaders at various levels of government. Yet, abusive 
elites have manipulated electoral processes and institutional checks-and-balances in their respective 
democratic societies in ways that state agents could openly and systematically abuse their power 
and undermine the individual rights of the governed populations — a process that can be blamed 
for the democratic recession that the world has experienced since 2005 (Diamond 2016). Even 
before Trump, big corporate interests and established political dynasties have persistently 
dominated federal and state levels of US politics.  
The emergence of Bernie Sanders and the eventual political success of Donald Trump —
both of whom are widely considered as outsiders of their own respective political parties— 
demonstrates the profound dissatisfaction in the often saturated and predictable policy positions of 
establishment politicians, who control either the Republican or Democrat parties. Yet, there are two 
key factors that facilitated the recent rise of Trump and Sanders in mainstream American political 
imagination. The first factor pertains to the “growing distrust of the formal institutions that organize 
social, economic, and political power within” individual states, while the second aspect refers to the 
“discontent with systems of power that appear to preserve and entrench prevailing class structures” 
(Hadiz and Chryssogelos 2017, 400-401). Hence, the rise of Trump reflects the “the erosion of the 
legitimacy of political elites, representative institutions and the globalist orientation that has long 
dominated US politics” (Chacko & Jayasuriya 2017, 121). In other words, the rise of authoritarian 
neoliberal politicians worldwide demonstrates a fundamental decline in the legitimacy of the 
American imperium. The second dimension, meanwhile, refers to the economic aspects of the 
contemporary decline of American power. I refer to the increasing economic inequality within many 
national political systems worldwide. While the extremely rich national and transnational elites 
continue to accumulate scandalous levels of wealth, a large number of people worldwide are 
suffering from extreme poverty. The continued slimming down of welfare states in the global North 
has made it more difficult for the most vulnerable citizens to escape from the systemic vicissitudes 
of poverty. Many Western states face severe pressures in sustaining their programs primarily 
because of their stagnant economic growth and weakened levels of economic competitiveness 
relative to the emerging economies in the global South and the complex challenges posed by 
neoliberal globalization (Bromund 2018; Razin and Sadka 2005). Although some European 
politicians are considering the implementation of the unconditional basic income for all citizens, as 
a necessary measure for the threats posed by automation of many types of jobs in the future, the 
fundamental question remains, particularly on the reliability of the welfare system (Van Parijs 
2013). Indeed, American power’s sustainability depends on its internal domestic stability, whereby 
economic growth and robust welfare provisions foster satisfaction and undermines social conflict.  
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Yet, domestically, the Trump administration unashamedly overturned the universal 
healthcare reforms that the previous administration fiercely struggled to implement amidst highly 
contentious politics across party lines. In the face of peaceful resistance brought by the majority, 
who are disadvantaged by neoliberalism, electoral democratic states have evolved to becoming what 
is now called by some scholars as “authoritarian neoliberalism”, which is constituted by two 
precepts: (1) coercion and criminalization of political opposition and (2) deployment of the state’s 
apparatuses that deters any form of external resistance against neoliberalism (Tansel 2017; Bruff 
2013).  
With the US as its epicenter, the 2007/2008 financial crisis highlighted the more fundamental 
failures of the American political economy that systematically privileges the logic of capital 
accumulation regardless of their domestic consequences to human rights. This political-economic 
logic becomes more evident when one looks into how Western states, including the US federal 
government, generously and unhesitatingly doled out billions of dollars as bail-out funds for failing 
financial conglomerates. More recently, even though Trump’s rhetoric highlights an economic 
nationalist strategy, business elites within and beyond the United States, as it was shown in the 2018 
World Economic Forum in Davos, have somehow discarded Trump’s sexism and racism. 
Accordingly, “much of the moneyed elite who pay the bills for many Davos festivities are willing 
to overlook what they portray as the American president’s rhetorical foibles in favor of focusing on 
the additional wealth he has delivered to their coffers”, especially that Trump “has made good on 
his words, having slashed corporate taxes and ditched regulations they view as anti-business” 
(Goodman 2018, 4 and 5).  
Also, a part of this decline in American power constitutes the severe budget problems that 
the US federal government has been facing. Mick Mulvaney, the most senior official on budget 
management issues in the Trump administration, confirmed that the “challenge of great stakes” 
refers to the fact that “$20 trillion national debt is a crisis, not just for the Nation, but for every 
citizen” and that “each American’s share of this debt is more than $60,000 and growing” (Office of 
the President of the United States/Office of Management and Budget 2017). In order to purportedly 
resolve the budget crisis, the Trump administration embraced a pro-business strategy by easing taxes 
for businesses and the rich people as the preferred policy strategy, while equitable economic growth 
remains outside Trump’s policy agenda (Office of the President of the United States/Office of 
Management and Budget 2018, 15). This commitment to lift the tax burdens of the elites have 
detrimental consequences to the already unreliable US welfare system.  
In a more alarming sense, even before Trump, the Obama administration faced severe 
challenges in building a moral consensus amongst politicians and their constituencies that it is the 
state’s obligation to guarantee an effective healthcare system, which can be reliably accessed by all 
Americans. Unsurprisingly, the Trump administration, during its first year, quickly spent its political 
capital in publicly vilifying and trying to dismantle the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Yet, it failed 
in fully repealing the ACA, and the White House has now focused in gradually introducing 
provisional amendments instead. This breakdown in political consensus that is needed for building 
and sustaining a robust social safety net system emerges amidst the Trump administration’s efforts 
to eliminate regulatory measures and to reduce, if not totally eliminate, the tax burden of wealthy 
business actors. In fact, during the early months of the Trump administration, the Republican Party 
tried to repeal the Obamacare and proposed instead the American Health Care act. In effect, the 
proposal constituted abolishing the health insurance of millions of US citizens while the US 
Congress pushed for 600$ billion worth of tax cuts for the richest 0.1 percent of the US population 
— an outcome that would save the most affluent Americans almost 200,000 USD worth of tax 
obligations each year (Matthews 2017).  
What does the problem of the neoliberal-induced weakening of the domestic American 
welfare mean for American power? First, the increasing economic inequality within the US and its 
constitutive entrenched patterns of racial and gender stratification pose enduring difficulties for the 
federal government to effectively govern the polity. This means that domestic and foreign policy 
proposals evade open, deliberative, and representative discussions involving diverse constituencies 
across the American society. Essentially, governance becomes an exclusively elite undertaking 
rather than a truly democratic and deliberative task of the diverse sectors of the American polity. 
Second, the continuous weakening and perhaps eventual dissolution of a system of state-supported 
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welfare entitlements could further increase the level of public distrust of state institutions, an 
outcome that further delegitimizes the domestic authority of the US government. Third, the prospect 
of serious political instability in the US tarnishes the global moral appeal of open and democratic 
societies and consequently bolsters alternative models of governance, including authoritarian modes 
of governance. Based on the 2018 Gallup World Poll survey, the US registered a remarkably low 
30% median approval rate across 134 countries (was previously 48% in 2017 under the Obama 
administration), which places it with China (31%) and Russia (27%) in the same interval group(Ray 
2018). This low approval rating suggests that it would be difficult for the US to project its economic 
and political interests in its bilateral relations with other states as well as in various global 
governance institutions. Perhaps this low rating could also be attributed to the global public sphere’s 
dissatisfaction of the US as an exemplary governance model.  
At the transnational level, the remarkable deterioration of the US economy and its failure to 
equitably distribute wealth across the society has radically undermined American power abroad.  
The sharp decline of US relative productivity and share of world merchandise since the start of the 
millennium increase the probability that rival states could use their expanding relative economic 
growth in challenging the already fragile American imperium (Mandel 2012).  Meanwhile, China, 
the world’s second largest economic power, boasts an average of 10 percent GDP annual growth in 
the last two decades — although this growth rate is expected to decline in the short-term at around 
7 percent. During the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party in Beijing, President Xi Jinping 
proudly declared that China contributes 30 percent of global economic growth and, most notably, 
laid out his “three-decade road map toward great power status, saying by 2050 the country would 
be a global leader in innovation, influence and military might” (Bloomberg News 2017). Also, other 
non-Western countries have continued to enlarge their share in the world economy including Russia, 
Brazil, Indonesia, and many others in the global South (Regilme & Parisot 2017b; Regilme & 
Parisot 2018.; Hameiri & Jones 2015; Gray & Murphy 2013).  
The rapid economic growth of non-Western powers poses new challenges and uncertainties 
in what used to be a world economic system that has been usually underwritten by American 
imperium. To further expand or at least sustain their economies, emerging markets from the global 
South have to project their political and military influence in various global governance institutions 
and geostrategic areas in ways that could facilitate such an expansion— and those efforts could, at 
times, clash against American interests. An example of this is the highly contentious rivalry between 
the US and China in the development aid sector in the African continent, whereby Beijing uses 
foreign aid to gain access to the valuable African natural resources and commodities that are needed 
for the continued growth of the Chinese economy (Regilme and Hartmann 2018). To the extent that 
such clashes could be detrimental to US power is an open question, although emerging powers in 
world politics tend to use their newly acquired economic wealth to fund their coercive apparatus 
that would then be used for further expansion of its political and economic power (Shlapentokh 
2004). For instance, since 2012, the Chinese government under Xi Jinping has been rapidly 
constructing and developing artificial islands in and militarization of the South China Sea (SCS), 
where 60% percent of economic goods pass by in this particular trade route(Graham-Harrison 2015; 
Regilme 2018a). This unprecedented Chinese interest in that maritime area shows the ways in which 
Beijing systematically discarded the territorial claims of other states including the Philippines and 
Vietnam. By flexing its military might in this highly contested maritime region, China has 
effectively declared that American dominance in Southeast Asia— underpinned by its naval and 
aerial military support to its allies and partners in the region— has to end. For China, future 
economic growth also requires its ability to rewrite the terms and conditions of the key global 
maritime trade routes through which China’s economic lifeblood flows.  
What does a weakened American power mean for the future of world politics? First, 
multilateral cooperation as a crucial mechanism of global governance could be undermined in favor 
of blatant and crude nationalist interests firmly entrenched in Trump’s “America First” paradigm as 
well as in the programs of other similar politicians in Europe and elsewhere. If reemerging powers 
such as India, Russia, and China, among others, continue to exert their influence in their immediate 
home regions and in global governance and justify such actions through the prism of blatant 
nationalism, then we are likely to see a world system with “multiple power centers, with the 
principal actors stressing the objective of vindicating their own national interests” (Carpenter 2017, 
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43). Second, the rise of blatant nationalism could severely undermine basic principles that protect 
individuals against abuses both from state and non-state actors. In contrast to authoritarian 
nationalism that has recently gained traction, liberal internationalism represents one of the key 
principles of the post-1945 world order, and it “embodies many bi-partisan principles: support for 
freedom, democracy, human rights, a free press, as well as an open world economy for the 
movement of goods, services, people, and ideas” (Chaudoin, Milner, and Tingley 2017, 1). If 
authoritarian nationalist politicians including Donald Trump continue to gain widespread support in 
various places worldwide, then arbitrarily defined notions of national interests — which are often 
abusively instrumentalized by domestic political elites — become bases of justification for increased 
domestic state repression of individual rights and welfare.  
This section examined the key elements that underpin the current decline of American 
power. I maintained that neoliberalism, which underpins the US domestic political economy and 
foreign policy strategies, has consistently reinforced the interests of the richest elites, while broad 
sections of the society remain hopeless without the support from a supposedly reliable US welfare 
state system. I hypothesized herein some of the plausible implications of the crisis in US domestic 
political economy, an outcome driven by neoliberalism. I emphasized that the continued neoliberal 
policies and authoritarian discourses of the Trump administration have undermined the moral appeal 
of American imperium. The next section discusses the implications of the US domestic crisis to 
American foreign policy and international human rights norms. 
 
 
4. Human Rights in the Era of Authoritarian Politics 
 
The neoliberal crisis, as shown by the failures in the US political economy, suggests that the 
current international human rights regime is in the midst of a critical juncture. Particularly, the four 
key organizing principles of world order —human rights, multiculturalism, and tolerance — are in 
distress. First, authoritarian politicians and social movements that explicitly and consistently uphold 
racist, sexist, and discriminatory political discourses and policy strategies have gained traction both 
in the public sphere and also in the corridors of power. Facilitated by neoliberalism, the global tidal 
wave of nationalist crony capitalism— constitutes a “reaction to social dislocations tied to processes 
of neoliberal globalisation”, emerged from the “new kinds of social marginalisation, precarious 
existence and disenchantment with the broken promises of liberal modernity” (Hadiz and 
Chryssogelos 2017, 399). As a key pillar of American dominance, the European Union’s (EU) self-
proclaimed identity as a ‘normative power’ (Manners 2002; Regilme 2013)— or as a key global 
promoter of democracy and human rights— has yet to make a formidable defense of such norms 
against some its most discriminatory politicians from within its domain. The far-right Alternative 
for Germany (AfD) political party in Germany in 2017 won almost 13 percent of the votes and has 
now 92 seats in the German Parliament or the Bundestag — thereby making the AfD the third largest 
party in the EU’s most influential member-state. In France, although Marine Le Pen’s Nationale 
Front (NF) lost to Emmanuel Macron’s En Marche! during the run-off elections, the NF has 
aggressively promoted anti-EU sentiments, nationalism, economic protectionism, and racism. Even 
the Netherlands, which is usually touted as one of the world’s most tolerant societies, was unable to 
escape from the tidal wave of illiberal populism. Although Geert Wilders of the anti-Islam and racist 
Freedom Party (PVV) did not succeed in becoming the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, he still 
remains in power as a parliamentarian and his PVV party won 20 out of the possible 150 seats in 
the House of Representatives — thereby making Wilders’ party as the second largest in the current 
formation of the Dutch government. Such challenges from these movements can also be seen in 
other key countries within the EU, including Austria, Hungary, Sweden, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, 
among others.  Thus, within the global North, many racist, sexist, and intolerant politicians and 
public figures have gained traction not only in the mainstream public sphere. Many of these political 
movements have now occupied important positions in the ruling government of some of the largest 
electoral democracies in the world. A key US ally in the Asia-Pacific region, Thailand, after the fall 
of the corrupt regime of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006, has now entered a period of political recession 
where a military junta has effectively replaced a system of competitive elections and a state that 
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effectively upholds civil liberties and rights(Regilme 2018b; Chachavalpongpun 2011). The 
Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte, meanwhile, has unashamedly abandoned the country’s human rights 
commitments and democratic reforms, in favor of killing poor people, harassing and detaining 
political dissidents, and empowering new and traditional elite groups. Those dynamics are also 
replicated in Turkey, where the Erdogan-led government has radically pursued his neoliberal 
economic policies through authoritarian measures and dismantlement of democratic checks within 
the Turkish state. Thus, even some of the American allies in the global South are now caught by this 
pandemic of authoritarianism. 
Second, American power has consistently failed to uphold the moral principles of material 
equality and global justice. American foreign policy —through its wide range of aid programs and 
vigorous public diplomacy— has championed the role of the state as a guarantor of free markets, 
property rights, and capital accumulation, which paved the way for other states worldwide to 
entrench further inequality while emboldening the political power of economic elites. In many 
global South countries, a robust welfare state tradition did not exist as US global dominance in the 
era of decolonization did not champion the principles of material justice — to the extent of 
advocating for equitable material distribution within and across newly formed national 
constitutional orders. Rather, US power has contented itself with civil and political rights as 
organizing principles within subservient states, while substantive issues of global governance 
focused only upon free trade, deregulation, and capital accumulation. As the human rights historian 
Samuel Moyn accurately notes, “the age of human rights has not been kind to full-fledged 
distributive justice, because it is also an age of the victory of the rich” (Moyn 2018, 2). No wonder, 
even Philip Alston (2017, 9), the former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial and arbitrary 
executions, contends that “economic and social rights must be an important and authentic part of 
the overall agenda” (Alston 2017). Alston’s experience in the UN Human Rights Council is telling: 
a very small percentage of all self-professed human rights nongovernmental organizations in the 
Council have any specific substantive focus on economic and social rights. Indeed, the dominant 
global human rights narrative has parochially focused only on the procedural elements of 
legitimation rather than the more pressing and morally compelling issues of material inequality and 
global justice. 
Nonetheless, the Trump presidency represents a new kind of departure in human rights 
rhetoric in US policy. Donald Trump’s political rhetoric reflects profound disdain for peaceful 
political opposition, competitive electoral processes, and constitutional checks-and-balances within 
the state. Despite the failures of neoliberalism, Trump’s predecessors somehow effectively 
concealed them through the legitimating discourses of procedural democracy and civil and political 
rights. Trump, on the other hand, shamelessly threw away those legitimation discourses and has 
consequently embraced authoritarian neoliberalism — although the full panoply of its material 
consequences has yet to fully unfold within and beyond the American society.  
There are several behavioral patterns that show how Trump departed from his predecessors’ 
human rights commitments both in terms of discursive rhetoric and actual practice. First, Trump 
has openly and proudly articulated his admiration for authoritarian leaders such as Xi Jinping, 
Vladimir Putin, Rodrigo Duterte, and Recep Erdogan (Beauchamp 2017). For example, Trump’s 
discursive rhetoric has consistently suggested his preference for the use of violent repression over 
peaceful means (Calamur 2018). In April 2017, when the notorious Philippine President Rodrigo 
Duterte boasted that he was directly involved in the killings of suspected drug dealers during his 
time as a city mayor, Trump fervently congratulated Duterte. Second, Trump and his cabinet 
officials have persistently discredited the legitimacy of Washington DC’s press corps and 
established news media agencies by incorrectly alleging them as promoters of ‘fake news’. Third, 
Trump’s foreign and domestic policy strategies have seldom invoked human rights as a foundational 
basis of public policy (Margon 2017). During his time as America’s top diplomat, Rex Tillerson 
systematically avoided media coverage of his foreign diplomatic missions, and more tellingly, his 
absence during the launching of annual Human Rights Report produced by his office suggests the 
low priority placed upon American human rights promotion abroad. In the landmark America First 
Document, which is the first federal budget strategy of the Trump White House, any reference to 
human rights was non-existent (Office of the President of the United States/ Office of Management 
and Budget 2017). Moreover, the 2018 budget strategy also mandates severe cuts on foreign aid and 
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contributions for multilateral institutions, many of which have been conduits of US interest in 
promoting human rights abroad. In summer 2017 and more recently, the US Ambassador to the UN 
Nikki Haley unashamedly threatened that the US may withdraw from the UN Human Rights Council 
“unless reforms are ushered in including the removal of what it sees as an “anti-Israel bias”” 
(Nebehay 2017, 1). Indeed, it is unprecedented for the White House to directly and explicitly use its 
longstanding commitment in global human rights institutions as a pawn in exchange for geostrategic 
considerations such as its relationship with Israel. Finally, the Trump administration has asked the 
US Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) to form a task force that will review cases of 
naturalized US citizens who lied in their citizenship applications — a policy that has long been 
introduced yet was rarely implemented during the Obama era. That same dynamic can be seen in 
the horrifying Trump policy of separating child immigrants caught at the US-Mexico border from 
their parents. Suggesting a sense of continuity from his predecessor, this policy from Trump “opens 
the door to him using a tactic Obama used in 2014: the wide-scale detention of immigrant families 
for as long as it took to complete their immigration cases and deport them” (Lind 2018, 2). Though 
Obama rhetorically committed himself to human rights, albeit falling short in practice, the Trump 
administration miserably failed both in human rights rhetoric and practice — and was particularly 
proud in doing so.  
Notably, Trump’s bellicose rhetoric and quite consistent disregard for human rights 
discourses does not fully constitute an unprecedented rupture on US foreign policy. Rather, such 
changes should be regarded as a continuation of the US-led war on terror’s disregard for civil 
liberties and physical integrity rights. In doing so, US officials and their neoliberal elite allies invoke 
military security as the justificatory premise to quell political dissidence and claims for material 
justice in favor of wealth accumulation. Especially after the post-9/11 war on terror, state officials 
and elites worldwide instrumentalized human rights to justify violence, political killings, and 
enforced disappearances of both civilians and armed individuals. Rebecca Sanders (2018, 2) calls 
this discursive tactic of authoritarian actors as the ‘plausible legality’ of highly controversial 
policies, whereby they use “evasive language, they manoeuvre through and around legal rules in 
order to justify human rights abuses, claiming that law means what they want it to mean”. That 
strategy has been quite evident since the post-9/11 global war on terror, when the US and its allied 
states deployed intensified violent repression not only to kill terror groups but also to quell peaceful 
political dissidence as a way of consolidating their fledgling domestic authority. Even before 
Trumpism, authoritarian nationalist discourses have been on the rise in the last few years, and the 
post-9/11 security climate has conditioned many people worldwide that public security can only be 
achieved through state’s intensification of political violence. No wonder that even after the end of 
the Bush presidency, there seems to be a “constant drumbeat of comments demanding a return to 
methods of interrogation” (Alston 2017, 3). That is why, in the broadest sense, Trumpism is not 
necessarily a radical rupture in post-Cold War world politics; instead, it represents the evolving 
culmination of a global political crisis of human rights that started since 9/11. 
To be clear, the US has been quite inconsistent “regarding human rights in foreign policy, 
practiced by not only the Obama administration from the start, but at the end of the day by all 
administrations”, (Forsythe 2011, 767)—not perhaps in terms of rhetoric and diplomacy but in terms 
of tangible policy outcomes. There are three plausible factors for such an outcome in US human 
rights policy abroad. First, in a highly competitive, nation-based world order, the US still perceives 
(unfortunately!) its compelling national interest as foundationally based upon military security and 
facilitating a neoliberal economic order upon which US capital and trade interests would thrive. 
Second, US foreign policy agenda has to thrive amidst competing interests of nation-states, 
numerous intergovernmental organizations, and various binding international human rights 
commitments. Third, a wide array of domestic and foreign pressures within the US federal 
government and beyond makes foreign policy unstable and unpredictable rather than persistently 
fixed in actualizing its human rights commitments. Thus, as David Forsythe (2011, 768) rightfully 
describes it: “administrations may aspire to realist, liberal, or ultra-nationalist (neo-con) goals in 
foreign policy, but in the end, they have inconsistent records on human rights issues” (see also 
Renouard 2016; Regilme 2018c). Lobby groups funded by wealthy elites and interest groups made 
it possible for domestic and foreign policies of the US less committed to human rights than it should 
have been(van Apeldoorn & de Graaff 2014). 
 13 
While procedural democracy, political liberalism, and neoliberalism constitute the US-
dominated world order  (Brown 2006), those principles are bound to fail due to its fundamental 
contradictions (Bridoux 2013). What Trump’s presidency and the rise of authoritarian populism 
reveal are exactly those inherent weaknesses of the global order’s organizing logic. Hence, I agree 
with Lora Viola (2017, 1) who contends that “Trump’s election and his foreign policy are not sui 
generis but the result of ongoing transnational structural transformations, including the failures of 
globalization and relative hegemonic decline”. First, despite the collapse of formal European 
colonialism and subsequent era of decolonization, the current world order constituted by material 
inequalities within and between nation-states is unlikely to be sustainable — and, that, exactly is the 
ontological defect that the American-dominated world system is built upon. As the theorist Michael 
Zürn rightly argues (2018, 96), “if the powerful founders (established powers or incumbent states) 
have institutionalized inequality from the beginning, and if there is no separation of powers to 
control this inequality, a shift in the underlying power constellation leads to contestation from the 
rising powers”. Several reemerging powers — especially China, India, Russia, Turkey — have been 
more assertive in articulating their national interests and the distributive inequalities within the 
current world order, particularly in terms of the distribution of power in various global governance 
institutions. That contestation — fueled by material grievances and identity-based insecurity 
brought by hierarchical differentiation — could lead to decay and instability of societies, especially 
in established powers such as the US and its rival states, especially China.  
Second, perceptions of systematic hypocrisy in US foreign policies and the political-
economic strategies of the Global North, especially in the policy areas of democracy and human 
rights promotion, have been gaining traction to the extent that they diminish the legitimating appeal 
of American power. For example, although the US Democrat Party complains that the rise of Trump 
was brought by the surreptitious yet systematic interference of the Russian government under 
Vladimir Putin, whose main objective was to destabilize the US from within, American power has 
always been interventionist — and, in many occasions, have systematically used organized violence 
upon civilians in order to further militaristic, geostrategic, and capitalist objectives.  
Third, American power has promoted a very shallow notion of human rights that undermines 
the emancipatory hope that dignity should be enjoyed by Americans regardless of their socio-
economic backgrounds. Within the US, the racial wealth gap remains at an abominable scale, 
whereby the US Census Bureau’s 2017 Population Survey reported that “black families in America 
earn just $57.30 for every $100 in income earned by white families”, or “for every $100 in white 
family wealth, black families hold just $5.04.” (Badger 2017, 1). Based on 2016 data, American 
women only earn “an average of only 79 cents for every dollar earned by a white man”, while “single 
women own a mere 32 cents for every dollar that single men own” — and such a gap becomes much 
sharper when classified along racial backgrounds (Mahathey 2016, 1-2).  Amidst these problems of 
material justice, governments of the global North have wholeheartedly supported the bail-out of 
failing corporate banking behemoths using ordinary people’s hard-earned money paid to the state 
as taxes. Those hefty billion-dollar bailouts proceeded amid the scandalous levels of reductions in 
state support for welfare goods such as education, healthcare, and other basic social services.  
This section argued that the fundamental contradictions in the relationship between electoral 
democracy, minimalist version of human rights4, and neoliberal capitalism have undermined the 
global human rights regime and the moral appeal of American power. Recognizing those challenges, 
the concluding section offers some preliminary ideas and strategies for rethinking, and hopefully, 
reforming the global human rights regime.  
   
5. Conclusions: Human Rights Reform in a Multipolar World 
 
My primary goal in this paper is to reflect upon the problem of American decline in the 
current world order and the rise of Trump as well as authoritarian politics elsewhere. Yet, that puzzle 
                                               
4 I refer to the civil and political rights as well as physical integrity rights. In this minimalist version, the state does not 
fully commit to upholding socio-economic rights through a sustainable and comprehensive system of welfare 
provision.  
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raises the important question that many conventional International Relations scholars systematically 
discard: Is there a world order to begin with? It depends on one’s positionality: order and stability 
exist for those who are in a position of power; existential insecurity and death await, meanwhile, to 
those who are left at the margins. Neoliberalism has normalized routinized suffering, life-
threatening inequalities, extreme poverty, and governments that are wholeheartedly willing to throw 
away huge amounts of money to save corporate behemoths rather than actual people’s lives. The 
political crisis brought by Trumpism — amidst the rise of neo-Nazism in Germany, Erdogan’s 
authoritarianism in Turkey, Geert Wilders’ racism in the Netherlands, and Rodrigo Duterte’s 
ongoing genocide of poor people in the Philippines — is a crisis of our political economy. Trump, 
like his predecessors, has used his privileged position and his presidential powers to enrich himself. 
Europe’s crisis emerges from its accelerated speed of neoliberal regional integration amidst a 
shrinking welfare state and a weakening commitment to public goods provision. Racist, sexist, and 
authoritarian politicians blame marginalized groups and identity politics as the main culprit— rather 
than neoliberal capitalism that has facilitated Trump and his peers elsewhere. Trumpism is 
distinctive only to the extent that it has unmasked the underlying logics of American power since 
1945, albeit in very unconventional ways through blatantly offensive discourses and publicly 
supporting policies that favor wealthy elites — tactics that were not systematically used by Trump’s 
predecessors. In other words, as Inderjeet Parmar accurately describes it, the US-led liberal world 
order is ‘imperialism by another name’ (2018: 151-172). This imperial logic constitutes racialized 
differentiation and hierarchization, gendered exploitation, and authoritarian discipline underpinned 
by the logic of wealth accumulation.  
Although reforming the global human rights regime is a complex task, I provide herein some 
preliminary thoughts of how we can move forward from this crisis. First, human rights activism 
may need to zoom into the quintessential issues of material equality and sufficiency as the 
foundational bases for human dignity. In doing so, tangible problems —such as extreme poverty, 
absence of an affordable and high-quality health care system, mass unemployment, and so on—
should be reframed as problems of global material justice. The dignity of all human persons can 
only flourish in societies where everyone’s material needs have been sufficiently fulfilled, while 
material insecurities remain tolerable (if not totally absent) to the extent that such gaps do not 
hamper the meaningful exercise of one’s stake in the deliberative governance of public policy 
problems.  
Amidst the underlying contradictions in US neoliberalism and the minimalist version of 
human rights promotion, emancipatory social movements may have to imbibe a conception of 
humanity that includes everyone as equal, indispensable, and non-tradeable (Chernilo 2017; 
Regilme 2018c). Neoliberalism has commodified human beings as tradeable entities in a market 
ruled by the logic of capital accumulation. That has to stop, and human rights movements should 
resist, by all means, any policy that upholds the logic of commodification of humanity — ranging 
from healthcare to education and even human organs. This logic of commodification has 
systematically killed millions of financially underprivileged people, with women, disabled 
individuals, and persons of color heavily bearing the brunt. While emancipatory movements remain 
local in their activism and advocacy, transnational cooperation and coalition-building should 
constitute as important tactical modes of pressuring national and global institutions for 
transformation. This tactic of emancipatory globalism should be imbibed in the spirit of parity, 
ethical curiosity, and deliberation instead of the persistent attitude of the so-called human rights 
organizations in global North to be patronizing and sometimes authoritarian when they deal with 
their counterparts in the global South. Calling for a sense of leftist internationalism, Michael Walzer 
(2018,8) urges American emancipatory movements to “write and argue in support of our[their] 
friends and comrades in other countries and in opposition to the enemies of democracy and equality, 
wherever they are”. While the democracy and equality have always been framed in terms of the 
concerns of the present generation, emancipatory politics has to be transgenerationalist in terms of 
temporal perspective. That means that emancipatory politics seriously considers the consequences 
of its actions not only to the present constituents of humanity but also to future generations thereof. 
If the global human rights regime has to save itself from the current crisis, then imperial modes of 
thinking and governance practices have to vanish — and perhaps that means the dissolution of 
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